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Abstract
This article discusses the action taken by New Zealand following Jacques Chirac’s announcement that France would conduct a series of eight nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific. New
Zealand eventually took its complaints to the ICJ and requested that their case from 1973-1974
regarding weapons testing be reopened.

NUCLEAR TESTING: NEW ZEALAND AND
FRANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE
Don MacKay*
INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 1995, the recently elected President of France,
PresidentJacques Chirac, announced that France would conduct
a final series of eight nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific
starting in September. President Chirac's announcement broke
the moratorium on nuclear testing observed by France and most
other nuclear weapon states ("nuclear powers") for the past
three years. It came just a month after the decision of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty' ("NPT") to extend
the treaty indefinitely. As part of that outcome, the nuclear powers had agreed to exercise the "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty.
Non-nuclear powers already felt a sense of betrayal over
China's nuclear testing within a month of the NPT compact being reached. France's announcement that it would soon follow
suit, fuelled that anger further, and sparked world-wide criticism. Even in France itself, polling suggested that there was
widespread anxiety and opposition over its Government's decision.
In New Zealand, the Government had already reacted
strongly to the Chinese test. Its reaction to the French announcement was both strong and immediate, with the Prime
Minister making a public statement in the New Zealand Parliament deploring the decision and urging the French Government to reconsider it. The New Zealand Parliament unanimously passed a resolution condemning any resumption of'
French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. A few days later, the
New Zealand Permanent Representative at the U.N. Conference
* International Legal Advisor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New
Zealand. The views expressed in this Essay are those of the Author personally and not
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade or of the New Zealand Government.
1. Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signatureJuly 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
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on Disarmament 2 took a similar stance, drawing attention to the
inconsistency between the French announcement and the undertaking given by the nuclear powers upon the extension of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A delegation from the South
Pacific region, at senior political level, including the New Zealand Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, quickly flew
to Paris to convey the region's deep concern to the French Foreign Minister.
New Zealand also initiated a series of intensive bilateral representations to the French Government urging it to reconsider.
The New Zealand Prime Minister wrote to the French President
calling attention to the strong public reaction in New Zealand,
and indicating that the French decision had cast a cloud over
the relationship between the two countries that would last as
long as the nuclear tests continued. He also expressed concern
about possible environmental consequences from the testing,
and pointed to the unanimous opposition of countries in the
South Pacific region to its resumption. In a unique adaptation
of new technology, the Prime Minister also addressed an open
letter to the President on the Internet, which invited those "surfing the net" to take up the issue. The New Zealand Ambassador
in Paris began extensive representations in the French capital,
and the French Ambassador in Wellington started out on what
was to become a well-trodden path to New Zealand Government
Ministers' offices to receive representations and protests. On
August 17, 1995, the New Zealand Prime Minister wrote to the
French President formally notifying him that New Zealand
would be taking France to the International Court of Justice.
This followed the decision, a week earlier, that New Zealand
would go to the Court in an endeavor to re-open the earlier "nuclear tests" case of 1973 and 1974.1 Five other South Pacific
States would subsequently intervene in the case.

I. BACKGROUND ON NUCLEAR TESTING
It is necessary to place New Zealand's reaction and that of
2. See generally, 1995 U.N. CONFERENCE
E.95.IX.1. The achievements and findings in
ence are published annually in the yearbook.
3. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J.

ON DISARMAMENT Y.B., U.N. Sales No.
the area of disarmament at the ConferId.
457 (Dec. 20) [hereinafter New Zealand

Case]; (Aust. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20) [hereinafter Australian Case].
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other South Pacific countries in context. The Pacific region has
been used for nuclear testing since shortly after World War II.
The consequences can be seen to this day, with ongoing radioactive contamination in some areas and some islands still uninhabitable. The United States initiated testing in the Marshall Islands
in 1946, and continued there until 1962. The United Kingdom
followed, testing in Australia from 1952 until 1957, and at Malden and Christmas Islands (now part of Kiribati) in 1957 and
1958. France took the decision to develop nuclear weapons in
the early 1950's and conducted its first test in the French Sahara
in 1960. Following Algeria's independence in 1963, France decided to shift its testing site to Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia. Although only four of the nineteen tests conducted in Algeria had been atmospheric, the French Government decided that
for engineering and economic reasons, testing in the South Pacific would be conducted in the atmosphere. The first French
test at Mururoa was conducted on July 2, 1966.
New Zealand protested vigorously over the commencement
of French tests in the South Pacific, and continued to do so, as
did other South Pacific countries. It has sometimes been suggested by French commentators that such protests were antiFrench or discriminatory, in that New Zealand did not protest
the earlier U.S. and British tests in the region. Indeed, even recently, it was suggested publicly by French sources that the protests of New Zealand and others to the current series of tests
were motivated by a desire to drive France from the South Pacific. That is not, and has never been, New Zealand policy.
Time has moved on from the early 1950's when New Zealand
and Australia acquiesced in the U.S. and British atmospheric
tests in the region and with time has come knowledge of the
consequences of such testing. In earlier tests, the testing countries even exposed their own personnel to fallout, because the
risks were not known. There was, however, emerging public disquiet, leading New Zealand to establish a monitoring system in
the Pacific Islands in the early 1960's to keep track of fallout. In
the United Nations, in 1958, New Zealand was associated with a
number of countries in sponsoring a resolution in the General
Assembly designed to promote conditions in which a comprehensive nuclear test ban could be realized. In 1959, New Zealand joined the appeal of African countries to France not to
carry out its announced intention of beginning nuclear weapon
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tests in the Sahara. In 1961, New Zealand publicly deplored the
Soviet Union's breach of the moratorium observed since 1958 by
three nuclear powers, which led to the resumption of nuclear
testing soon after by the United States and the United Kingdom.
A year later New Zealand voted in the General Assembly, along
with an overwhelming majority of governments, to condemn all
nuclear weapon tests and to demand their cessation. Indeed,
since 1972, New Zealand had taken the lead in tabling a resolution each year at the U.N. General Assembly calling for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to be negotiated. Following the
adoption of the 1962 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,4 New Zealand was the fourth nation to sign, preceded by only the three
sponsors of the Treaty. New Zealand's strong opposition to nuclear testing, and nuclear weapons, has also been expressed in
domestic legislation5 which among other things prohibits the entry of nuclear armed vessels into New Zealand ports. This led to
the suspension of the ANZUS6 alliance by the United States and
a lengthy freeze in a long-standing political and security relationship with the U.S. that was highly valued by New Zealand.
Opposition to nuclear testing has long been shared by other
countries in the South Pacific region as well. As long ago as
1954, the people of the Marshall Islands petitioned the United
Nations Trusteeship Council about fallout from U.S. testing,
which harmed the inhabitants of Rongelap and Utirik Atolls.
Countries in the region have strenuously opposed testing for
many years, and the South Pacific Forum 7 has long adopted resolutions opposing nuclear testing. The region has also strongly
opposed proposals by other countries to dump radioactive and
toxic waste in the waters of the South Pacific, the importation
into the region of chemical and toxic waste including that for
destruction at the Johnson Island plant operated by the United
States, and the shipments of plutonium through the region by
Japan. All these activities are regarded with deep apprehension.
4. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S.
No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. The ban prohibited all nuclear tests in any environment but
underground. Id.
5. The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act
(1987) (N.Z.).
6. See ANZUS, Sept. 1, 1995, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 131 U.N.T.S. 83. ANZUS is the Mutual

Defense Treaty between the United States, New Zealand and Australia. Id.
7. An annual meeting of the Heads of Government of the independent countries
of the region.
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They are viewed by small and potentially vulnerable island states
as exposing the region's environment to risks from hazardous
activities from which they derive no commensurate benefit, and
which those conducting the activities are often doing a long way
away from their own main centers of population. Nuclear testing in the South Pacific by France has been viewed no differently. Assurances by France that the tests are safe have inevitably
invited the response that, if so, why were they not being conducted closer to Paris. It has been well-known, of course, that
this would not be acceptable to most of the French population.
In these circumstances, the debate has often become passionate.
Although testing by China, the United States, and the Soviet
Union has also engendered strong opposition in the region on
disarmament grounds, the fact that it has been conducted in
those countries' metropolitan areas means that it has never
stirred up quite the same level of emotion as the testing by
France.
The South Pacific region's strong opposition to nuclear testing there has also found expression in several legal instruments.
A Conference on the Human Environment in the South Pacific
held in Rarotonga in 19828 ("Raratonga Conference"), urged
that a treaty be negotiated to protect the South Pacific environment including from nuclear contamination. These negotiations eventually resulted in the adoption of the Noumea Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region 9 ("the Noumea Convention")
on November 25, 1986. This Convention, which entered into
force on August 22, 1990, has some similarities to other regional
seas conventions. In other respects it is quite different. Among
its obligations is one contained in Article 12, entitled "Testing of
nuclear devices," which requires that the parties take appropriate measures to limit environmental damage caused by nuclear
testing.1" This Article had its genesis in the desire of South Pa8. See SPREP, Report of the Conference on the Human Environment in the South
Pacific, Rarotonga, Cook Islands, Mar. 8-11, 1982, reprintedin UNEP Regional Seas Reports and Studies, No. 31.
9. Noumea Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, Nov. 25, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 38 (1987) [hereinafter Nou-

mea Convention].
10. Id. art. 12, 26 I.L.M. at 47. "The parties shall take all appropriate measures to
prevent, reduce and control pollution in the convention area which might result from
the testing of nuclear devices." Id.
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cific Countries that the Regional Environment Convention
should prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons. It became abundantly clear during the extensive negotiations leading up to the
Convention that France would not become party to any instrument with such an express prohibition. Eventually, as a compromise to ensure that the region obtained as much protection as
possible from a Convention, which was widely supported within
the region, it was agreed that Article 12 would take its present
form. It was carefully drafted to ensure that it did not condone
the continuing conduct of nuclear testing in the region. The
Noumea Convention also contains a number of other highly pertinent obligations including an express obligation in Article 16
to undertake an environmental impact assessment ("EIA")
before embarking on any major project that would affect the
marine environment.1
Nuclear testing was also a major factor in the adoption of
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 19852 ("Treaty of
Rarotonga"), which entered into force in 1986. This Treaty reflects the collective will of South Pacific nations to renounce the
possession of nuclear weapons, to ensure that nuclear weapons
are neither tested nor stationed on national territory in the region, and to gain assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons from
nuclear powers.
In order to be fully effective, such nuclear free zones require the support of all nuclear powers, and the Treaty of Rarotonga has several protocols under which nuclear powers can undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
South Pacific states and not to test nuclear weapons in the region.1 3 Although the Soviet Union and China became party to
these protocols in 1988, France, the United States, and the
United Kingdom steadfastly refused to do so. The reason for
France's refusal to become party to the protocols was that it
wished to continue to test its nuclear weapons within the region,
11. Id. art. 16, 26 I.L.M. at 48. An environment impact assessment ("EIA") is re-

quired before embarking upon any undertaking "which might affect the marine environment". Id.
12. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1440 (entered
into force Dec. 11, 1986) [hereinafter Treaty of Rarotonga]; Status of South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and Final Text of the Three Protocols to the South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, opened for signatureAug. 6, 1985, 28 I.L.M. 1599 (1989) (entered into force Dec. 11, 1986) [hereinafter Rarotonga Protocols].
13. See Rarotonga Protocols, supra note 12, 28 I.L.M. 1599.
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or at least to maintain the option to do so. While the United
States and the United Kingdom had no intention of testing nuclear weapons in the region themselves, and specifically stated
so, their refusal to sign was undoubtedly to maintain solidarity
with the one nuclear power, France, which did wish to continue
testing there.
II. NEW ZEALAND'S PREVIOUS LEGAL ACTION AGAINST
FRANCE
A. The Nuclear Tests Cases of 1973-74
After fruitlessly protesting to France over many years regarding its atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific, in late 1972, New Zealand and Australia began looking into
the possibility of bringing cases in the International Court ofJustice. On May 4, 1973, the Prime Minister wrote to the French
President telling him that New Zealand was submitting the dispute to the International Court, and this was followed on May 9,
1973, by the lodging of a New Zealand Application instituting
proceedings. Subsequently, on May 14th, a Request by New Zealand for Interim Measures of Protection was lodged with the
Court. Australia filed a parallel but not identical case.
The New Zealand Application asked the Court to declare
that the conduct by the French Government of nuclear tests in
the South Pacific region that gave rise to radioactive fallout constituted a violation of New Zealand's rights under international
law, and that these rights would be violated by any further such
tests. The rights for which New Zealand sought protection included rights owed erga omnes14 and rights owed specifically to
New Zealand. They were the right that no nuclear tests that gave
rise to radioactive fallout be conducted; the right to preservation
from unjustified artificial radioactive contamination of the terrestrial, maritime, and aerial environment; the right that no radioactive material enter the territory of New Zealand, the Cook
Islands, Niue, or the Tokelau Islands, including their airspace
and territorial waters (collectively "the Territory"), as a result of
nuclear testing; the right that no radioactive material, having entered the Territory cause harm including apprehension, anxiety
14. Erga omnes rights are those rights that have such import that all states have a
legal interest in their protection. Barcelona Traction, Lights and Power Co. (Belg. v.
Sp.) 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
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and concern to their people and Government; and the right to
freedom of the high seas, without interference or detriment resulting from nuclear testing. These rights had their genesis in
principles of, respectively, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Stockholm Declaration," territorial sovereignty, the Trail Smelter 6 and
like cases, and the law of the sea.
On May 23 and 24, after it had considered the parallel Australian case, the International Court of Justice heard New Zealand's oral argument in support of its Request for Interim Measures of Protection. On June 22, 1973, the Court, by 8 votes to 6,
indicated measures of protection, ordering inter alia that the
French Government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radioactive fallout on the Territory. A similar Order was
made in the Australian case. The Court also decided that the
next phase of the cases should be concerned with the questions
ofjurisdiction and admissibility. Following the filing of Memorials by New Zealand and Australia, the Court held oral hearings
on both cases on July 10 and 11, 1974.
The Court delivered its Judgment in December 1974, after
an unusually long delay. By a vote of 9 to 6 the Court found that
New Zealand's claim no longer had any object and that it was
therefore not called upon to give a decision on it. This conclusion was based on a number of official statements made publicly
by France in the course of 1974, which the Court decided evidenced an intention to cease conducting nuclear tests in the atmosphere following the completion of the 1974 series. On this
basis, the Court found that the objective of New Zealand had, in
effect been accomplished "in as much as the Court finds that
France has undertaken the obligation to hold no further tests in
the atmosphere in the South Pacific." 7 The dispute between
New Zealand and France having disappeared in the Court's view,
the New Zealand claim no longer had any object and there was
nothing on which to give judgment.' 8 A similar Judgment was
delivered in the Australian case.1 9
France did not participate in any of the proceedings in 1973
15. Report of the U.N. Conference on Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14
and Corr. 1, § 1 at 1 (1972).
16. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1906 (1949).
17. New Zealand Case, 1974 I.CJ. at 475..

18. Id. at 476-79.
19. Australian Case, 1974 I.CJ. at 272.
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and 1974, nor did it appoint an Agent or file any pleadings.
France maintained the view that the Court was manifestly incompetent to hear the case, and that it could not accept the Court's
jurisdiction. In defiance of the Court's Order indicating Interim
Measures of Protection that it not do so, France continued to
test in the atmosphere.
Various observers have suggested that the Court's reading
of the New Zealand Application was strained in some respects.
Unlike the Australian Application, New Zealand's Application
was not cast solely in terms of atmospheric testing. Furthermore,
the Court matched the New Zealand Application and the French
atmospheric undertaking without giving New Zealand the opportunity to be heard on that approach. On the other hand, the
Court did give New Zealand the satisfaction of a ruling that
France was now legally bound not to test in the atmosphere, and
it made that ruling without having first determined that it had
jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case.
Although, in 1974, the Court found that the dispute was at
an end, the door was left slightly ajar for New Zealand to return
to it. In paragraph 63 of its Judgment the Court said:
63. Once the Court has found that a State has entered into a
commitment concerning its future conduct, it is not the
Court's function to contemplate that it will not comply with
it. However, the Court observes that if the basis of this Judgment were to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions
of the Statute; the denunciation by France, by letter dated 2
January 1974, of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, which is relied on as a basis of jurisdiction in the present case, cannot constitute20 by itself an ob-

stacle to the presentation of such a request.

There were in fact two bases on which New Zealand invoked
the Court's jurisdiction in its 1973 Application. First, New Zealand relied on the General Act for the Specific Settlement of
International Disputes, 1928,1 to which New Zealand and
France had acceded on the same day, and which neither had
ever denounced. Second, New Zealand argued that a reserva20. New Zealand Case, 1974 I.C.J. at 477.
21. General Act for the Specific Settlement of International Disputes, Sept. 26,
1928, 93 L.N.T.S. 343, 1931 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 (Cmd. 3930).
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tion lodged by France excluding from its acceptance of the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause, inter
alia disputes concerning questions of national defense, 2 did not
apply ratione materiae to the dispute. France subsequently moved
to denounce the General Act, and also to remove itself entirely
from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, in January 1974,
some months after Australia and New Zealand initiated their
proceedings.
B. French Testing in the South Pacific 1974-92
Following the Judgment handed down by the Court on December 20, 1974, France moved its nuclear testing program underground. From then until its moratorium on testing in 1992,
France exploded some 134 nuclear devices in the South Pacific.
During this period it also extended its testing program beyond
the Mururoa site to include nearby Fangataufa Atoll. From
1988, Fangataufa was the site for all major nuclear explosions of
over seventy kilotons. The French tests continued to draw protests from New Zealand and other South Pacific states, bilaterally
and in multilateral fora. The South Pacific Forum, in its annual
communiques, also continued to condemn the tests. This period was also marked by further international litigation between
New Zealand and France linked to its nuclear testing, following
the sinking of the Greenpeace vessel "Rainbow Warrior" by
French Government agents in Auckland on July 10, 1985.23
C. The "Rainbow Warrior" Arbitration
The ."Rainbow Warrior" was sunk at its moorings in Auckland Harbour, as a result of extensive damage caused by two
high explosive devices. A Greenpeace photographer on board
was killed. The attack against the Rainbow Warrior was carried
out by a team of French agents acting under official orders from
the Directorate General of External Security. The Greenpeace
vessel had been scheduled to proceed to Mururoa to protest
22. France Accession to General Act for the Specific Settlement of International
Disputes, May 21, 1931, 1931 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32, at 15-16 (Cmd. 3930). France reserved its acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction for "disputes concerning
activities connected with national defence." Id.
23. What's News World-Wide, WALL ST.J., Dec. 24, 1985, at 1. "France has agreed to
pay damages to the environmentalist group Greenpeace for the July 10 sinking of its
ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbor. . .

."

Id.
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against France's underground nuclear testing, and the sabotage
was carried out to stop this protest action. Although most members of the French team of agents quickly fled New Zealand by
yacht, two were arrested. They were Major Alain Mafart and
Captain Dominique Prieur of the French Armed Forces. France
refused New Zealand's request to extradite or prosecute the
three other known members of the team. Subsequently, in a
communique issued on September 22, 1985, the Prime Minister
of France confirmed France's responsibility for the attack.2 4 The
French Minister of Foreign Affairs also accepted responsibility
for reparations for any losses resulting from the incident. In November, Major Mafart and Captain Prieur pled guilty in the New
Zealand Courts to charges of manslaughter (culpable homicide)
and wilful damage to a ship by means of an explosive. They were
each sentenced to a term of ten years imprisonment.
The sinking of the "Rainbow Warrior" caused a major political scandal in France. The French Government was highly embarrassed, and the Minister of Defense resigned. In New Zealand, there was a deep sense of public outrage. It was the first
time in New Zealand history that such an act of international
violence had been carried out by the armed forces of a foreign
state in New Zealand territory. The sense of outrage was magnified by the fact that the State responsible was a traditionally close
friend and ally. There was a widespread public view that the two
French agents should serve out the lengthy sentences imposed
on them by the New Zealand judicial system, and should not be
released early. France, however, placed considerable pressure
on New Zealand, including trade and economic pressure, to try
and get it to release the two agents. It was made clear by France
that a settlement of the affair could only be achieved if the
agents were released. Bilateral efforts to resolve the differences
between the two countries were undertaken over several months
and in June 1986, following an appeal by Prime Minister Lubbers of the Netherlands, the two governments formally approached the Secretary-General of the United Nations and referred to him all the problems between them arising from the
Rainbow Warrior affair, for a binding ruling.

24. Id.
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The Secretary-General issued his Ruling on July 6, 1986.25
At the heart of the dispute was the fate of the two French agents.
Major Mafart and Captain Prieur were to be transferred to a
French military facility on an isolated island outside of Europe
for a period of three years. The island of Hao in French Polynesia was selected as the appropriate location. They were to be
prohibited from leaving the island for any reason, except with
the mutual consent of the two governments. The Secretary-General also ruled that the Prime Minister of France should convey
to the Prime Minister of New Zealand "a formal and unqualified
apology for the attack, contrary to international law, on the
'Rainbow Warrior' by French service agents which took place on
10 July 1985." He also ruled that the French Government
should pay US$7 million to the New Zealand Government as
compensation for all the damage it suffered.
As events transpired, neither Major Mafart or Captain
Prieur were to serve out their full terms on Hao Atoll. Major
Mafart was transferred to France on December 13, 1987, by the
French authorities for medical reasons, without New Zealand
consent. At this stage, he had served less than seventeen months
of his three year term on Hao. The French Government refused
to return him to Hao, despite the New Zealand Government's
requests that it do so. Subsequently, on May 5, 1988, three days
before French Presidential elections, Captain Prieur was also
unilaterally removed from Hao Atoll by the French authorities,
without New Zealand's consent, on the grounds that she was six
weeks pregnant and that her father was dying. She had served
just over twenty-one months of her three year term on Hao.
Once again, despite requests from New Zealand, the French
Government refused to return her to Hao.
Again, bilateral discussions between the two countries failed
to resolve the dispute between them, regarding the premature
removal of Major Mafart and Captain Prieur from Hao. Accordingly, in late 1988, New Zealand decided that it would resort to a
provision in the Secretary-General's Ruling - which was also included in a bilateral agreement between the two countries which
incorporated the Ruling - which provided an arbitral procedure for the settlement of any dispute concerning its interpreta25. U.N. Secretary General: Ruling on the Rainbow Warrior Affair Between France and
New Zealand, 26 I.L.M. 1346 (1987).
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tion or application. Both sides appointed Agents and during the
course of 1989 filed Memorials and Counter Memorials. Oral
proceedings were held in New York from October 31, 1989 to
November 3, 1989.
On April 30, 1990, the three person Arbitral Tribunal,
which was chaired by, Eduardo Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, a former
President of the International Court of Justice and coincidentally, a Member of the Court in the 1973-74 Nuclear Tests Case,
issued its Award. In the case of Major Mafart, it unanimously
declared that France had corimitted a breach of its obligations
to New Zealand by failing to order his return to Hao, although
the majority held that his initial removal was not in breach. In
the case of Captain Prieur, the Tribunal unanimously held that
France had committed a breach by not endeavoring in good
faith to obtain New Zealand's consent to her removal from Hao,
by subsequently removing her from Hao, and by failing to order
her return to Hao. The majority held, however, that as the three
year period which Mafart and Prieur were to serve on Hao had
now passed, France's obligations were at an end, and accordingly
it would not now order their return. The Tribunal unanimously
declared, however, "that the condemnation of the French Republic for its breaches of its treaty obligations to New Zealand,
made public by the decision of the Tribunal, constitutes in the
circumstances appropriate satisfaction for the legal and moral
damage caused to New Zealand."26 The Tribunal also recommended that the two Governments set up a fund to promote
close and friendly relations between the citizens of the two countries, and that the French Government make an initial contribution of US$2 million to the fund. This recommendation was
subsequently implemented by the two Governments, and the
fund continues to operate, to good effect, to this day.
III. THE 1995 CASE
As already indicated, France's announcement in June 1995
that it would abandon the moratorium on nuclear testing and
recommence testing in the South Pacific led to a variety of actions by New Zealand. These included the New Zealand Government despatching a naval hydrographic vessel to accompany a
26. Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (N.Z. v. Fr.) (award of Apr. 30, 1990), reprinted in
INT'L ARB. REP.,

May 1990, at A-1, A-8.
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peace flotilla of private yachts which went to Mururoa. Consideration was also given to whether there was scope for further
legal action against France.
It was no longer possible to bring new proceedings against
France in the International Court ofJustice. France's denunciation of the General Act and its withdrawal from the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court, in January 1974, meant that the door
had been closed on those jurisdictional bases for bringing a case
before the Court. Attention, therefore, focussed on the possibility of reopening the earlier proceedings, exploiting the opportunity left by the Court in paragraph 63 of its Judgment of December 20, 1974.
It was clear that there would be considerable legal difficulty
in taking such a step. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Rt.
Hon. Jim Bolger, was quite frank about the advice that he had
received from the New Zealand Government's lawyers in this respect. Most legal commentators agreed with this assessment.
There was, however, a strong view in the New Zealand Parliament, and in the wider community, that all possible means
should be attempted in an endeavor to prevent the resumption
of French testing. On August 8, 1995, a meeting of the leaders
of all seven political parties represented in the New Zealand Parliament, including the Government, agreed unanimously that
New Zealand should return to the International Court. The
Court was advised informally on August 9, 1995 that New Zealand would be bringing a case before it. The written proceedings would be filed just thirteen days later.
A. The Difficulties in Attempting to Reopen the Case
The legal team ("team") that assembled to handle New Zealand's case faced formidable legal obstacles. The major hurdle
was in linking the case back into the Court's 1974 Judgment.
New Zealand needed to seek a reopening of the earlier case on
the basis of the limited opportunity left open by the Court in
paragraph 63. There was no jurisdictional basis on which to ask
the Court to entertain a fresh case and any attempt by New Zealand to do so would surely fail in limine and would not even
reach a hearing.
There was no precedent for reopening a case in the way that
New Zealand was now attempting. Procedurally this raised some
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novel issues. It was even unclear as to by what procedure New
Zealand could move to reopen the case. The rules of Court set
out clear procedures for initiating cases by way of Application.
New Zealand avoided such a procedure, however, to quash any
suggestion that New Zealand was seeking to initiate proceedings
de novo. The team found it also necessary to avoid any procedure which might suggest that New Zealand was seeking an interpretation or a revision of the earlier Judgment, since this
would now be time barred. The team therefore decided that the
most appropriate action would be to lodge with the Court a document entitled "Request for an Examination of the Situation,"
since this followed precisely the opening left by the Court in paragraph 63. A "Further Request for the Indication of Provisional
Measures" would be filed soon afterwards.
New Zealand's strategy of seeking to resume the earlier
case, rather than begin a new one, led to other procedural idiosyncrasies. Resurrection of the earlier case required that the applicable Rules of Court be those in force at the time of the institution of the proceedings in 1973, although they had been significantly revised since that time. The team therefore dusted off
the old 1972 Rules and consistently proceeded on the basis that
they, rather than the current Rules, were the ones which applied
to the case.
The appointment of the Judge ad hoc was another idiosyncrasy. In 1973, the Australian ChiefJustice, Sir Garfield Barwick,
had been appointed as Judge ad hoc by both the New Zealand
and Australian Governments in their respective cases. It followed that if the earlier case was still alive, Sir Garfield Barwick
was still the Judge ad hoc. It was felt, however, that in the current
circumstances it would be more appropriate to have a New Zealander as Judge ad hoc. Sir Garfield Barwick, who was by now
quite elderly, was located in Australia, and he agreed to address
a letter to the President of the Court resigning the position.
Finally, the team also gave thought to an attempt at having
the matter dealt with in the Court's new Chamber for Environmental Matters, which it had established in 1993. It was considered that the composition of the Chamber might favor a more
sympathetic consideration of the New Zealand case than the full
Court. In the end, however, it appeared that such a course of
action would not be clear cut, and it was not pursued.
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In addition to the procedural difficulties, New Zealand also
faced major substantive difficulties in reopening the case. The
most obvious of these was the Court's ruling in 1974 that the
case dealt with atmospheric testing. 2 7 It was also clear that the
French underground testing activities of which New Zealand
now complained, had been entirely within the contemplation of
both the Court and the Parties in 1974. New Zealand had not
protested the Court's Judgment in these terms nor endeavored
to return to the Court at the time to seek an interpretation or
revision of its Judgment. An examination of the record shows
that the New Zealand Government had, for the most part, been
satisfied with the accomplishment of its immediate objective,
namely the cessation of atmospheric testing in the South Pacific.
While it had never specifically acquiesced in underground testing 28 - and in later years had vigorously protested this - New
Zealand never suggested that it was illegal or that the Court's
Judgment was too narrow.
The New Zealand case also faced real problems on the evidentiary side. While it was clear in 1973 and 1974 that there was
radioactive fallout from France's atmospheric tests, and that this
fallout was directly affecting New Zealand and the Pacific Island
countries or territories for which it had international responsibility, that was not now the situation with regard to French underground testing. Although there were real, and entirely legitimate, concerns about the long-term effects that the underground testing might be having on Mururoa and Fangataufa
Atolls, scientific opinion was that there would be negligible radiological impact beyond the territorial sea. A top nuclear physicist within the New Zealand Government system had made statements publicly to this effect. On the other hand, several nongovernmental scientific sources in France had publicly expressed
27. New Zealand Case, 1974 I.C.J. at 466. "[F]or purposes of the Application, the
New Zealand claim is to be interpreted as applying only to atmospheric tests, not to any
other form of testing, and as applying only to atmospheric tests so conducted as to give
rise to radioactive fallout on New Zealand territory." Id.
28. In a public statement the day afterJudgment, the New Zealand Prime Minister
recalled:
IT] hat New Zealand's concern about nuclear testing had never been confined

to the particular case of tests conducted by France - or, indeed, to the question of testing in the atmosphere. It would continue to be the New Zealand
Government's aim to bring about the ending of all forms of nuclear weapons
testing, by any country.
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fears about the consequences of testing on the physical integrity
of the atolls. Moreover, the three scientific missions which had
been allowed to visit Mururoa had been restricted in what they
could do, and had raised questions and concerns which had
never been satisfactorily answered by the French Government.
No missions were ever even permitted to visit Fangataufa.
A further obstacle faced by the New Zealand team, was the
elapse of time. Given that New Zealand was seeking to reopen a
Judgment delivered twenty-one years earlier, the issue would inevitably arise as to why New Zealand was seeking to do so now,
and what had changed from earlier. If the team did not satisfactorily deal with this question, New Zealand would inevitably be
prejudiced by its failure to reopen the case earlier.
Finally, the New Zealand team faced very real time constraints. French sources had suggested publicly that the first test
would be held in early September. New Zealand needed to file
proceedings as quickly as possible, with a view to having the application for interim relief heard or at least filed before the first
test. The team therefore set themselves the goal, which they
were to meet, of filing the proceedings no later than August 21,
giving them just thirteen days. The New Zealand team
researched amassed and assessed a huge amount of legal, scientific, and historical material during this brief period as the New
Zealand documents were put together.
B. New Zealand's Request to Reopen the Earlier Case
On August 21, New Zealand filed two documents with the
International Court in The Hague. The main document, entifled "Request for an Examination of the Situation," set out the
background to the case before the Court in 1973 and 1974, including the 1973 Order Indicating Interim Measures of Protection and the 1974Judgment. The Request examined the significance of paragraph 63 of the 1974 Judgment, and the circumstances in which New Zealand could seek to have the case
reopened. It also set out concerns regarding the impact of
French underground testing on the atolls at Mururoa and Fangataufa and the surrounding environment. It argued that
France was obliged to conduct a prior EIA before resuming underground testing in the region, pointing to the specific Treaty
undertaking in the Noumea Convention referred to earlier and
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to customary international law. It also argued that conduct that
causes, or is likely to cause, the introduction into the marine environment of radioactive material is illegal, pointing both to pertinent treaties and to the precautionary principle.29
The continuity argument advanced by New Zealand, in essence, was that the Court concluded in 1974 that New Zealand's
concerns about radioactive contamination of the environment
were "matched" by France's promise to cease atmospheric testing. The Court had at that time assumed that underground testing would not damage the environment or breach international
law. By 1995, that assumption had become demonstrably wrong.
In terms of paragraph 63, New Zealand had, therefore, shown
the basis of the Judgment to be affected by new underground
testing.3' New Zealand could thus resume its 1974 case against
France accordingly.
New Zealand concluded its written request by submitting
that the Court should, in the words of paragraph 63 of the 1974
Judgment, "examine the situation" as it now existed. As a matter
of priority and urgency, New Zealand asked the Court for provisional measures to protect its rights, which fell within the scope
of those invoked in the 1973 application, pending further consideration of the case. At the present time, New Zealand sought
recognition only of those rights that would be adversely affected
by entry into the marine environment of radioactive material in
consequence of the further tests to be carried out at the
Mururoa or Fangataufa Atolls, and of its entitlement to the protection and benefit of a properly conducted EIA. Within these
limits, therefore, New Zealand asked the Court to adjudge and
declare: (1) that the conduct of the proposed nuclear tests
would constitute a violation of the rights under international law
of New Zealand, as well as of other States; and further or in the
alternative, (2) that it was unlawful for France to conduct such
tests before it had undertaken an EIA according to accepted international standards, which established that the tests would not
give rise, directly or indirectly, to radioactive contamination of
the marine environment.
29. The "precautionary principle" is the notion of an exhaustive examination as to
the effects on the environment of a government activity prior to the continuance of
such activity which poses a significant risk to nature.
30. New Zealand Case, 1974 IJ.C. at 477. "[T]he basis of the Judgement to be affected ...." Id.
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The accompanying "Further Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures" sought an Order as a matter of urgency
that France refrain from conducting any further tests and undertake an EIA, and that neither Party take action of any kind which
might aggravate or extend the dispute or prejudice the rights of
the other Party, pending the final decision of the Court in the
proceedings. Also accompanying the Requests was a letter from
the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs requesting the President of the Court to exercise his powers under Article 66(3) of
the 1972 Rules and ask the parties not to do anything that would
change the status quo pending the hearing.3 ' This request that
the President of the Court exercise his powers under the Rules
was repeated on subsequent occasions. Although the request
was repeated in a letter to the President from the New Zealand
Prime Minister immediately following the first French test on
September 6, 1995, and also in informal meetings, the President
of the Court was never to exercise his powers under Article 66(3)
of the 1972 Rules. The President of the Court explained, at the
commencement of the oral hearings, that as those powers expressly applied to incidental proceedings for the indication of
provisional measures, he had considered it difficult to accede to
those requests without prejudicing the issues before the Court.
Along with the requests, New Zealand lodged a nomination for
the appointment of ajudge ad hoc in substitution for Sir Garfield
Barwick. The nominee was Sir Geoffrey Palmer, a former Prime
Minister, and Professor of Law at Victoria University of Wellington and at the University of Iowa.
Two days later Australia filed an "Application for Permission
to Intervene" in the case. This was shortly followed by similar
applications from four Pacific Island states: Western Samoa, Solomon Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Marshall Islands. Australia had considered applying to the Court to reopen
its own case along the same lines as New Zealand, but had concluded that it would be unsuccessful. Unlike the New Zealand
case in 1973 and 1974, the Australian case had specifically
sought an end to "atmospheric" nuclear testing.
France then responded to the New Zealand documents
which had been forwarded to it by the Court. By letter of August
31. Rules of Procedure of the International Court ofJustice, art. 66(3), 1946 I.C.J.
Acts & Docs. 14-15, as amended 11 I.L.M. 899, 913-14 (1972).
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28, 1995, the French Ambassador in The Hague informed the
Court that, in the view of his Government, there was no basis
upon which the Court might find, even primafacie, the jurisdiction to entertain New Zealand's Requests. The 1974 case had
related exclusively to atmospheric tests, as the Court itself had
found. As the Court manifestly lacked jurisdiction in the absence of the consent of France, neither the question of the
choice of ajudge ad hoc, nor that of the indication of provisional
measures arose, and the case should be removed from the General List.
France maintained this position at a preliminary meeting
between its Representatives, the New Zealand Co-Agents and the
President of the Court, which was held at the Peace Palace on
August 30, 1995. At that meeting no assurance was given by the
President that there would be a hearing. France continued
strongly to argue that there was no case in existence, as it had
expired in 1974. This was vigorously contested by New Zealand,
which sought a hearing as early as possible. Faced with these
differences, the President, in what he acknowledged was a procedural innovation, invited each Party to submit an aide-mimoire on
the issues. After that the Judges would meet informally, on September 8, 1995, to discuss the matter and whether a hearing
should be given. Although the New Zealand side argued that, as
the case subsisted, the Judge ad hoc should be present and able
to participate in the September 8 meeting, this was not accepted.
The President's decision to defer any appointment of a
Judge ad hoc presented a dilemma for the New Zealand side illustrative of the tyranny of distance often faced by Southern Hemisphere countries. If Sir Geoffrey Palmer awaited a decision as to
his appointment before he proceeded from New Zealand to The
Hague, half the World away, the prospect was that he would not
be there in time to participate in the opening stages of the oral
hearings. It was therefore decided to ask Sir Geoffrey to go to
The Hague in advance of the Court's decision, so that he would
be available if he was required. Sir Geoffrey agreed to do this
and was, in fact, in The Hague when the Judges decided, on September 8, to appoint him, at which stage he was immediately
able to enter into the necessary arrangements with the Court.
New Zealand and France both submitted aides-mimoires in
response to the President's invitation (and New Zealand subsequently, a supplementary aide-mimoire). These essentially reiter-
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ated and elaborated upon the positions already taken by the respective Governments. Nevertheless, New Zealand regarded
France's continuing participation in this process as an extremely
welcome development, given its non-participation in 1973 and
1974, although the French aide-metmoire stated that in no sense
did it constitute acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court or
prejudice France's future position.
The Judges, none of whom had been on the Court in 1973
or 1974, met to discuss the case informally for the first time on
September 8, 1995. They agreed by a majority, at that time, not
only to appoint Sir Geoffrey Palmer as Judge ad hoc, but also that
a public hearing would be held the following Monday, September 11, on the question: "Do the Requests submitted to the
Court by the Government of New Zealand on 21 August 1995 fall
within the provisions of paragraph 63 of the Judgment of the
Court of 20 December 1974? "32 France had, by this time, conducted its first nuclear weapon test of the series, at Mururoa, on
September 5. In another, more welcome development, however,
it was reported from Paris that France had decided to participate
in the oral hearings of the case.
C. The Oral Hearings
Although France had decided to participate, it was to become apparent that the French perspective and the New Zealand perspective as to precisely what the oral hearings would
comprise were quite different. This emerged when the Agent
and Co-Agents of New Zealand and the Representatives of
France next met with the President of the Court, to discuss procedure, on the morning of the hearing. France's objective was
to have the hearing completed in the shortest possible time, that
afternoon, enabling it to disengage quickly. France also sought
to characterize the hearing as an "informal" one, although this
was rejected by the Court. New Zealand, in contrast, sought two
to three sessions to enable a full presentation of its argument on
the question. The argument, the team said, would necessarily
cover whether the 1974 case contemplated continuity, under
what conditions, and whether those conditions had been satisfied. While New Zealand stated that it would very much prefer
32. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.CJ. (Sept. 11) (forthcoming) (ruling to hold
hearing).
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France to be present for the entire hearing, it did not want this
at the expense of curtailing its case.
As no agreement was forthcoming at this time, the Parties
were requested to reconvene with the President before the first
formal Court session in the afternoon. This second meeting resolved matters only minutes before the Court was due to sit in
formal session. The hearing would be spread over two days, with
each party being accorded the same amount of time, as well as a
brief response time. While this was a little shorter than New Zealand had initially aimed for, it had achieved its main objectives of
having all counsel heard without interruption and of having
France remain in the process.
In opening New Zealand's oral presentation, the Attorney
General, Hon. Paul East, expressed New Zealand's deep sense of
regret and frustration at France's decision to proceed with its
first nuclear weapons test since 1991, despite the clearly expressed views of the international community that it should not
do so. He said it was particularly regrettable that France had
begun its nuclear tests before the Court had been able to consider the New Zealand Requests. Furthermore, France's actions
in carrying out the first test on September 5, and its continuing
determination to proceed with further tests, highlighted the urgency of the case and the need for immediate provisional measures. The Attorney General characterized the matter as one of
"vital importance" for New Zealand and other South Pacific
that had
countries, and pointed to the rioting and destruction
33
occurred in Tahiti following the recent French test.
As regards the proper interpretation of paragraph 63 of the
Court's 1974 Judgment, the Attorney General and other New
Zealand counsel argued that New Zealand's 1973 application
was not limited to atmospheric testing and was in essence a dispute about nuclear contamination. The source of that contamination was incidental. New Zealand's prayer in 1973 had been
that the Court adjudge and declare that the conduct of nuclear
33. Opening Statement of the Hon. Paul East (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. Pleadings

(Nuclear Tests) (forthcoming) (Sept. 11, 1995).
New Zealand approaches this Court as an appropriate and responsible forum
which can respond to the legal aspects of the concerns of our region. By having such matters heard in a considered and judicial manner, it is hoped that
much of the tension and anger which has led to the rioting can be dissipated.
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tests in the South Pacific constituted a violation of New Zealand
rights under international law. Moreover, the operative part of
the Court's 1973 Order referred to the need to avoid nuclear
tests in general and was not restricted to atmospheric tests. New
Zealand's 1973 Application also included concern regarding the
living resources of the sea.
New Zealand also pointed out that underground testing at
the time of the 1974 Judgment was not an issue, and the Court
then had no evidence before it that such testing either could or
could not lead to radioactive contamination of any part of the
environment. In contemplating the idea that the basis of the
Judgment might be affected in some way in the future, the Court
was not solely thinking of a resumption by France of atmospheric nuclear testing. The Court specifically said it was not contemplating any breach by France of its undertaking not to continue with atmospheric nuclear testing. Accordingly, New Zealand argued, the Court had instead been concerned that nuclear
testing by France at some future time could give rise to artificial
radioactive contamination of the environment in a manner not
foreseen in 1974.
New Zealand argued that paragraph 63 was a mechanism
enabling the continuation or the resumption of the proceedings
of 1973 and 1974. They were not fully determined. The Court
had foreseen that the course of future events might, in justice,
require that New Zealand have the opportunity to continue its
case, the progress of which was stopped in 1974. And to this
end, in paragraph 63 the Court had authorized the derivative
proceedings now brought by New Zealand.
France's argument was that the case had been definitely
closed by the Judgment of the Court on December 20, 1974.
The whole case was about atmospheric tests and only atmospheric tests, and this was evident from the Court's judgment. In
this respect, France drew support from the passage in the Judgment which said that the New Zealand Application should be
interpreted as applying only to atmospheric tests. On this basis,
French counsel argued that the 1995 Request by New Zealand
was of a "wholly artificial and unacceptable nature," there was
"quite simply no 'case', within the meaning of the Statute, and
no 'proceedings' within the meaning of the Rules of which [the]
Court is validly seised." France argued that paragraph 63 had
been drafted "in order to reassure New Zealand in the event of
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France being tempted to resume atmospheric tests." More colorfully, France asserted that "New Zealand, masquerading behind paragraph 63, is seeking to conceal what is in fact a new
case, taking up a dispute that is quite dead but that it pretends to
believe is merely asleep."
France also argued that the New Zealand Request failed because there was no provision within the Statute of the International Court of Justice3 4 within which the request fell. The Request was, said French counsel, "an unidentified legal object."
Paragraph 63 of the Judgment required that any application
New Zealand might make pursuant to the paragraph had to be
"in accordance with the provisions of the Statute." 5 The present
Request could not be brought within the terms of the Statute, as
New Zealand had specifically stated that it was neither an application for interpretation of a Judgment under Article 6036 or a
request for a revision of a judgment under Article 6131 (which
would, in any event, be time barred).
Consistent with France's position that there was no case
before the Court and that it was simply engaged in what one
counsel described as "hearings about hearings," at no stage did it
appoint an Agent. Also, the French legal team appeared in
court in regular business attire, not in the national court garb as
is the practice before the International Court.3 8 Moreover, the
French side's written answer to a question asked by the Judge ad
hoc was headed "Rponse d M. Palmer," while the other answers
were "d M. lejuge Weeramantry" and so on. This approach was in
contrast to the New Zealand legal team, who wore national court
dress. Indeed, the Members of the Court itself were formally
garbed. The French approach led Vice-President Schwebel to
later comment, in a declaration appended to the Court's Judgment, that "when fifteen judges gathered in their robes in the
Great Hall of Justice of the Peace Palace, and when Judge ad hoc
Sir Geoffrey Palmer took his oath of office, the Members of the
Court did not meet, Pirandello style, in search of a courtroom or
34. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE,June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993 at 25, 3 Bevans 1179 [hereinafter SICJ].
63.
35. New Zealand Case, 1974 IJ.C. at 477,
36. SICJ art. 60, 59 Stat. at 1063, T.S. No. 993 at 33, 3 Bevans at 1191.
37. Id. art. 61, 59 Stat. at 1063, T.S. No. 993 at 33, 3 Bevans at 1191.
38. The exception was Sir Arthur Watts, the former Legal Adviser in the British
Foreign Office, who appeared for France dressed as an English Queen's Counsel.
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a case, but conducted an oral hearing on a phase of a case." 9
While much of the argument before the Court centered
around the language of paragraph 63 itself, the New Zealand
side also wished to place before the Court the environmental
implications of French nuclear testing in the South Pacific and
the relevant international law. The question posed by the Court,
whether the Requests submitted to the Court by the Government
of New Zealand on August 21, 1995, fell within the provisions of
paragraph 63 of the Judgment of the Court of December 20,
1974, seemed to the New Zealand legal team to be sufficiently
broad to permit this.4" In addition to asserting that the case was
still alive, New Zealand argued that there was a prima facie case
for the Court to examine the Judgment because of the new developments which were outlined in its Request. The basis of the
Judgment had been affected by: (1) changes in the factual situa-tion which showed there was now a risk of nuclear contamination from France's underground nuclear testing; and (2)
changes in international law, which had progressed from the
point it was in 1974, so clarifying the standards to be applied to
the dispute.
For New Zealand, this approach had several attractions. As
well as forming a key element in the New Zealand legal argumentation, it would ensure that the Court was properly apprised
of the very real concerns of the South Pacific region, and of the
broader issues involved, when they addressed the question
before them. New Zealand also hoped that it would draw France
into a debate about the environmental implications of its testing
program in the region, something it had steadfastly declined to
do previously in such an international forum. While the French
side were to criticize New Zealand for the breadth of its response
to the Court's question, it should always have been apparent
from the Request, the aide-mimoire, and the informal discussions
before the Oral Hearings, that this was New Zealand's approach.
As far as the environmental impacts were concerned, New
Zealand faced a quite different situation from that in 1973 and
1974, when there were demonstrable effects from French atmospheric testing upon New Zealand and those territories for which
39. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. (Sept. 22) (forthcoming) (declaration of
Vice President Schwebel).
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (stating question posed by Court).
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it had international responsibility. New Zealand could make no
such claim in 1995. Instead, it had to rely upon broader environmental concerns, such as the risk of contamination to the
marine environment from the accumulation of some 126 nuclear waste "stockpiles" within Mururoa Atoll, and eight large
stockpiles within Fangataufa Atoll. There appeared to be little
doubt that, at least in the longer term, there would be leakages
of radiation from the atolls into the marine environment,
although as noted earlier, scientific opinion tended to minimize
its impact. New Zealand was also able to point to serious concerns raised publicly by a French vulcanologist, Professor Pierre
Vincent, about the impact of testing on the physical structure of
the atolls. Moreover France had never permitted a full scientific
investigation of Mururoa; only three limited investigations had
been allowed. No independent scientific mission had ever been
permitted to visit Fangataufa, the site of the largest explosions.
There was also evidence of accidents and leakage in connection
with actual testing activities. New Zealand submitted that there
were serious concerns which France needed to address. In this
respect, it was successful. France took up the invitation to debate the environmental issues in front of the Court, and comprehensive coverage was given to them.
The second leg of this New Zealand argument was that international law now obliged France to ensure the safety of its
testing program for the marine environment and to carry out an
EIA beforehand, which it had not done. In this respect New
Zealand relied upon the development of norms to protect the
global environment, as well as specific treaty obligations. It
pointed to the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, and the onus
they placed on states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control did not cause damage to the environment of
other states or of areas beyond the limits of their jurisdiction. As
well as this, New Zealand pointed out that particularly high international standards had developed regarding the introduction
of radioactive material into the marine environment, and the international community no longer accepted that the testing of
nuclear weapons justified marine contamination.
New Zealand also sought to apply emerging international
law relating to EIA's and the application of the precautionary
principle. In particular, New Zealand drew upon the Noumea
Convention to which both New Zealand and France are parties.
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As mentioned earlier, the Noumea Convention contains an explicit obligation, in Article 16, to conduct an EIA before embarking upon any major project "which might affect the marine environment."4 ' In addition, there is an explicit duty, in Article 12,
"to prevent, reduce and control pollution in the Convention
Area which might result from the testing of nuclear devices. "42
New Zealand argued that, with regard to this latter obligation as
well, France clearly could not be satisfied that it had fulfilled it
unless it had first conducted a comprehensive EIA on the impact
of the tests. It was also pointed out that the "Convention Area"
covered by these treaty obligations includes not only high seas
areas but also the territorial sea around Mururoa and Fangataufa. Accordingly, New Zealand was not required to prove
that French testing was damaging New Zealand or even areas
beyond France's jurisdiction. It was sufficient for there to be an
adverse environmental impact or potential impact on the territorial waters around the atolls, which appeared to be inevitable.
New Zealand argued, in accordance with the precautionary
principle which now applied at international law, it was for the
state contemplating potentially harmful activities to carry out an
EIA and to establish that there was no real risk; the onus was not
on other states to demonstrate that there would be a risk.
France, in response, acknowledged a general duty to prevent
damage to the environment, although it questioned the status of
the "precautionary principle," and argued that the EIA obligation left each state with a "considerable margin of discretion." It
also disputed the reversal of the burden of proof. France also
asserted that it actively endorsed the latest requirements of international law in the field of environmental protection. The
Court was assured that the precautionary approach was precisely

the approach that France had always adopted, and that it would
do so again during the remaining tests.
The two day hearing concluded on September 12, and th
Court retired to consider its decision. It presented its Order ten
days later, on September 22. It said that the question to be answered comprised two elements. The first, in essence, was
whether the 1974 Judgment provided a procedure sui generis,
which enabled New Zealand to come back to the Court to seek
41. Noumea Convention, supra note 9, art. 16, 26 I.L.M. at 48 (1987).
42. Id. art. 12, 26 I.L.M. at 47 (1987).
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to have the case reopened, or whether the provisions of the Statute now precluded it from doing so. The Court found for New
Zealand on this issue.
The second issue was whether the basis of the 1974 Judgment had been "affected," within the meaning of paragraph 63,
by the facts which New Zealand had referred to. In this respect
the Court found by a majority of 12 to 3, that the basis of the
Judgment was France's undertaking not to conduct any further
atmospheric- nuclear tests, and it was only in the event of a resumption of atmospheric tests that basis of the Judgment would
have been affected. The Court said that, having taken the position that its 1974 Judgment dealt exclusively with atmospheric
nuclear tests, it could not now take account of New Zealand's
arguments relating to the conditions in which France conducted
its underground nuclear tests since 1974 or the development of
international law in recent decades. On the same basis, the
Court held that it had to dismiss the "Application for Permission
to Intervene" submitted by Australia and the similar applications
submitted by Samoa, Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands, and
the Federated States of Micronesia, all of which were proceedings incidental to the New Zealand Request.
In giving its Order, the Court was not taking any position on
the legality of France's nuclear tests or the conditions in which it
conducted them. Indeed, the Court specifically said that its Order was "without prejudice to the obligations of States to respect
and protect the natural environment, obligations to which both
New Zealand and France have in the present instance reaffirmed
their commitment."
In addition to the majority Judgment, one of the majority
Judges issued a separate opinion, three others made separate
declarations, and the three dissenting Judges issued quite
lengthy separate opinions. The latter considered that New Zealand established strong grounds for reopening the earlier case.
Their opinions contain some useful dicta on international environmental law. The opinions of Judge Weeramantry and Judge
ad hoc Palmer canvass the relevant legal principles in some detail, and make comments supportive of, inter alia, the precautionary principle, EIA's, the illegality of introducing radioactive
waste into the marine environment, and the principle that damage must not be caused to other states. Judge Weeramantry
notes that the case presented the Court with a preeminent op-
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portunity to make a pronouncement on the concept of intergenerational rights, among other things, and regretted that it
had not done so. Judge Koroma comments that under contemporary international law, there is probably a duty not to cause
gross or serious damage to the environment, together with a
duty not to permit the escape of dangerous substances; given
this trend, he says, it can be argued that nuclear testing would be
considered illegal if it would cause radioactive fallout. Judge
Shahabuddeen, in his separate opinion said that while he agreed
with the Court's Order, he understood New Zealand's concerns
and agreed with its case on several points. Judge Oda, in a declaration, said that as the Member of the Court from the only country that had suffered the devastating effects of nuclear weapons,
he felt bound to express his personal hope that no further tests
of nuclear weapons would be carried out under any circumstances in the future.
Less than two months later New Zealand was back before
the International Court, again voicing its dismay over French nuclear testing. New Zealand was one of a number of states making oral submissions to the Court on the requests by the World
Health Assembly and the U.N. General Assembly for Advisory
Opinions regarding the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
France had, by then, conducted two further nuclear tests in the
South Pacific in the course of its current series. The New Zealand Attorney General told the Court that "South Pacific countries have had to put up with nuclear testing for far too long.
These tests, and France's refusal to stop them forthwith, have
only reinforced in our mind that the international community
must turn up the pressure on nuclear weapons."43 The Attorney
General reiterated New Zealand's earlier position that French
nuclear tests were "contrary to international law," and said that
the Court "would be making a major contribution to the nuclear
non-proliferation regime, and to nuclear security generally, were
it now to find that any testing of nuclear weapons should be regarded as no longer permissible at international law." As of the
date of writing this Essay, the Court has still to present its decision on the two requests for Advisory Opinions.

43. Statement of the Attorney General before the International Court of Justice
(Nov. 1995).
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CONCLUSION
On March 25, 1995, France, along with the United States
and the United Kingdom, at Suva in Fiji, signed the Protocols to
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, including the undertaking not to test nuclear weapons in the region. This action
brought to a close the chapter on nuclear testing in the South
Pacific. The chapter on nuclear testing anywhere should shortly
be closed with the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty which New Zealand has sought for so many years. What
will become of Mururoa and Fangataufa, and the legacy they
bear from nuclear testing, only time will tell. The signing of the
Protocols was viewed with relief in New Zealand, and many in
France will have felt the same way. The two countries can now
move forward as Pacific partners, without the longstanding irritant of nuclear testing between them.
International law, and the international legal process, has
had its role to play in this development. In 1973, the proceedings brought by New Zealand and Australia in the International
Court of Justice, and France's violation of the Court's Interim
Measures of Protection, caused considerable discomfort within
that Country. It is reasonable to assume that the proceedings,
and France's apprehension of an adverse Judgment on the merits, was one of the factors which led it to stop testing atmospherically and move its tests underground. Later, France's acknowledged a breach of international law in sinking the "Rainbow
Warrior" to try and stop protest against its nuclear tests, and the
1990 finding of the International Arbitral Tribunal that it had
later acted illegally in removing the saboteurs Marfart and Prieur
from Hao Atoll, were also significant embarrassments to the
French Government. Those actions further undermined support for the undertaking - nuclear testing - which they were
designed to protect.
The 1995 Court case was also part of this mosaic. It was part
of a spontaneous worldwide protest against the resumption of
nuclear testing in the South Pacific. It highlighted once again
the strength of feeling of South Pacific countries. And it added
to the pressure placed on the French Government, not least
through the media attention which the case attracted in Europe.
The results of the international protest of which it was a part,
can probably be measured in several ways. First, in the South
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Pacific, the French tests which were carried out eventually numbered six and not the eight initially indicated, and all nuclear
powers have at last become signatories of the Protocols to the
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Second, the level of
international opprobrium received by France served clear notice
on the other democratic nuclear powers not to contemplate similar action, should they have been tempted to do so. Third, and
perhaps most significant in the longer term, was agreement by
key countries on a "zero" threshold in the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty negotiations. Through this action, they have acknowledged the clearly expressed wish of the great majority of
the international community that any nuclear testing is unacceptable.

